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The governments new Heat Strategy review took on board many of the arguments for district heating, and even the use of solar, that previously had been rather marginalised. It identified pathways for the transition of the UK's heat supply to low- and zero-carbon energy sources in the domestic and industrial sectors.

The Combined Heat and Power Association (CHPA) was delighted. It said that 'the Strategy points the way to a major expansion of new district heating networks in towns and cities, driving a multi-billion pound investment programme in green infrastructure and creating an additional 40,000 jobs in construction and engineering'.

The CHPA noted that previous Government studies had suggested that 8 million dwellings could be connected to district heating at reasonable cost, along with a major share of commercial and public buildings, through a 25 year capital programme, investing £2bn p.a. in new district heating infrastructure. Through this programme carbon emissions from heating would be halved and reduced to around 9 million tonnes per annum. It added 'Networks could adapt to obtain heat from gas-fired CHP plant, biomass and biogas, heat pumps, energy-from-waste, solar thermal, along with heat rejected from industrial processes and power stations. This approach, which is commonplace in continental Europe and Scandinavia, delivers reliability and security to energy users and provides a credible and practical pathway to decarbonisation.'

However the policy shift wasn't that large: the Heat Review still backs electrification as the main supply focus, since 'electricity is universally available' and, in well insulated houses, heat pumps can make using it for heating relatively economic. But it did admit that gas grids act as energy stores and are better at coping with variable demand, so that there would, in an electrified system, be more need for storage and demand management, as well as a lot more green generation capacity- almost double the present amount, given electrification of transport as well! Basically from nuclear and offshore wind, plus gas CCS.

Even so, it looks to biomethane and hydrogen, as new fuels, sourced from biomass, that could be used for heating, although it warns that biomass resources will be 'constrained and contested' and probably best used for industry and transport, where higher energy intensities are important. And, a little provocatively, it says large-scale biomethane injection into the gas grid is not realistic 'when efficiency losses are taken into account'.

So, apart from some direct use by industry for process heating and for local district heat networks, it sees gas delivery on a national scale is being phased out, with cooking being done by electric hobs and perhaps induction heaters. A big change for many people. Interestingly, micro CHP is seen as just a transitional option, but solar heating is seen as valuable, especially if combined with interseasonal storage, implying large scale 'heat accumulators' /community heating systems. The industry section is useful, with, in addition to improved process efficiency, gas and biomass CCS seen as a possible option.
Overall interesting then, still wedded mainly to electricity, plus some heat networks. But there are few actual commitments or future supply numbers, just a general plan: a full policy is promised within a year.

www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/news/pn12034/pn12034.aspx

Things do seem to take time! The Renewable Heat Incentive for example- which was meant to start the ball rolling. It was set up in two parts, with support of larger business schemes already established, along with an interim domestic-scale grant competition, the Renewable Heat Premium Payment scheme (RHPP), offering one-off payments for homeowners wishing to install green heating systems. DECC had been expected to launch the full domestic RHI in October this year, alongside the Green Deal loan scheme, but it has now decided to delay it until summer 2013, and will instead inject an extra £10m into the budget for the interim RHPP, taking it up to £25m, while reviewing cost control measures.

After its run-in with the PV solar Feed-In Tariff, the government is clearly worried that the projected costs of the RHI scheme, which unlike the FiT, will be met out of government funds, i.e. from taxes, will need to be controlled and kept below the fixed £860m budget. So it's launched proposals to carefully manage the RHI budget. For the existing business scheme, as a temporary measure, it will suspend registrations at one month's notice once 80% of the budget has been allocated. DECC said it will introduce proposals for a permanent cost-control mechanism by the end of the financial year, which could see tariffs fall in line with increased uptake.

Meanwhile, under the new extended RHPP, for the first time, communities seeking to install renewable heating systems will be able to take advantage of the scheme, with around £8m of the budget set aside for local projects. DECC has also earmarked £10m for social landlords to upgrade heating systems, after the social landlord competition last year received such a strong interest that DECC increased the initial £3m budget to £4m.

The Government said it wanted at least 25,000 households to take up RHI offers in the first year. So far, under the first phase of the RHPP, £4.8m has been cashed in by housholders, and 37 social housing schemes have also registered But, given the new review, Gaynor Hartnell, Renewable Energy Association CEO, feared the market will be killed off before it even starts: 'To launch an official consultation on bringing the shutters down, having only just fired the starting gun on the RHI, is premature to say the least'.

www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/meeting-energy-demand/heat/4805-future-heating-strategic-framework.pdf

Some of the heating issues were followed up in the subsequent DECC, DEFRA and DfT Bioenergy strategy, which backs the 'use of biomass to provide low carbon heat for buildings and industry (process heating), through either biomass boilers or through use of biomethane'. It adds 'Use of recoverable waste heat from low carbon power generation or industrial processes is also an important component of this pathway', noting that 'combined heat and power generation offers more efficient use of the biomass resources and should be promoted where possible'.

It also notes that Bioenergy carbon capture and storage (BE-CCS) offers net carbon removal from the atmosphere or 'negative emissions', which 'could then be used to offset fossil fuel emissions from other harder to decarbonise sectors. This makes BE-CCS an exceptionally valuable technological option'

The Combined Heat and Power Association was again delighted, noting that the stress had shifted to the use of heat networks rather than individual boilers to provide domestic heat, and the recovery of waste heat when used in an industrial setting. www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/news/charleshbgbio/charleshbgbio.aspx

It does seem that, for once, new ideas are beginning to be listened to. I will be exploring some of them in my next Blog.

I have often been less than impressed by reports from the Royal Academy of Engineering (RAE) , which usually seems to take a conservative line on energy issues, but their new report on heating for buildings seems overall very well done, although with lapses. It makes the sensible point that we need to deal with the building envelop first, but also notes that most of the houses that will be lived in by 2050 have already been built, so we must look to remedial measures. It also notes that 'Manchester isn't Leipzig', and looks at patterns of heating need and perceptions of comfort. It assumes we are talking about well insulated buildings, and familiar levels of comfort, and it reviews the energy supply options for supporting that.

It sets the scene by pointing out that 'If space heating could be decoupled from water heating it would change the selection criteria for heating appliances and boilers. There would no longer be a need for the heating system (as opposed to the hot water system) to be on standby during summer months or to be capable of operating at a sufficiently high temperature to prevent Legionella developing in water systems. All domestic heating is currently thought of as low-grade heat requirement, but there is a case for distinguishing space heating as low grade and hot water as medium grade. A policy for heat should separate these two different uses'.

It looks at heat pumps as a possibility, but is not too convinced. 'While the general reduction in carbon intensity of grid electricity makes the use of electric heating (direct or via a heat pump) more attractive, peak heat loads tend to coincide with peak electricity loads. There is, therefore, a significant likelihood of heating demand being met by high carbon electricity generation brought onto the system to meet peak loads over and above the capacity of low carbon generators'.

It goes on 'Air source heat pumps have been rising in popularity for new build in the UK, but this is partly an effect of the way in which electrical energy is treated in the regulations that makes CO2 targets more lenient than for gas systems.' While it admits that 'Air source heat pumps integrate well with well insulated dwellings, if properly sized and installed,' and it suggests that 'micro-CHP complements and could balance some of the properties of heat pumps', it also notes that 'several reports discuss inadequacies of the application or system engineering in heat pump installations. It is clear that heat pumps are not forgiving if installed inappropriately.'

By contrast, it's much happier will larger-scale communal system. 'Communal air source heat pumps are an interesting area of development with some new configurations of systems coming to market. Central systems may be more efficient and are likely to offer much greater energy storage than do systems designed for individual household'.

It adds 'Larger district systems, incorporating a CHP facility and providing heating are significantly more efficient than domestic level installations. This is because waste heat can be used in district heating after it has generated an element of electricity. Such district heat is therefore always of significantly lower CO2 emissions than any heat only production utilising the same fuel'. And that, it seems, includes domestic scale heat pumps.

The RAE does seem to been moving towards community- scaled system across the board. However, it is less happy with renewables. Although it sees some potential for bioenergy e.g for CHP/District Heating , it is not very impressed with solar, and overall treats renewables as problematic in terms of grid power supply, reverting to the traditional RAE line on the problems of intermittency and the delights of nuclear: 'During the summer months, most of the night-time load could be provided by nuclear power with renewables providing additional power during the day', while in winter 'we would need sufficient renewables to guarantee 40GW during the evening peak. As wind, tides and the sun are intermittent, that would require significantly higher installed capacity of renewables or thermal back-up capacity, much of which would be unused for long periods in the summer' making renewables uneconomic.

Nevertheless, it does look at smart grid /load management options which might change the situation radically, helping to deal with intermittency. A bit grudging, but at least there is now some recognition that a new interactive supply and demand system might be viable. It's taken decades to get the community CHP/DH message across to the traditionalist engineers, so maybe it's too early for idea of smart dynamic grids to have got through! And it may take even longer for them to give up on 'baseload' nuclear, which they still see as essential, rather than as getting in the way of a more interactive flexible system based on renewables ( which is the view emerging from Germany) .

However, as far as CHP/DH in concerned, the RAE is now full of praise. It says that 'CHP plants, biomass combustion, and heat pumps are more efficient, reliable and cheaper at scales larger than a single dwelling. The costs of large scale heat pump installations per kW are a quarter of that for domestic-scale installations.' It adds that 'it is more efficient to use the available skills for fewer large systems than for many individual units', and that, since energy storage will be needed 'district heating systems have another important benefit - the mass of water in the underground pipes provides a heat store that evens out daily peaks and troughs in demand. This can be supplemented by hot water tanks to increase energy storage'. And taking it one step further, it points out that 'well insulated hot water tanks or underground inter-seasonal thermal stores will be simpler to provide on a community basis given the small (and reducing) size of most UK homes'.

Some sense last! And DECC seem to be taking notice, in their new Heat strategy- see my next Blog.

'Heat: degrees of comfort?' Royal Academy of Engineering www.raeng.org.uk/heat

The Climate Change Committee's report on bioenergy earlier this year was somewhat more cautious than many previous studies, arguing that, at best, the UK might only get 10% of its energy from bio-source by 2050. The CCC saw bioenergy as a scare resource, with significant constraints, not least land use. This of course is a global issue, with for example, in terms liquid biofuels, there being many concerns about the environmental and social impacts of large plantations around the world. It's not just direct land use, it's the impacts of land use changes ('ILUC') that matter, which CCC say must be included, though they are hard to assess. But if at least a 50% emission reduction, below that from fossil fuels, is set as a target, there's less room for manoeuver.

When it comes to solid biomass for heat and power production, things get a little easier in terms of land use. CCC say 'Our core scenarios focus on the use of abandoned agricultural land', with a range of energy crops being viable: 'We assume in the longer term dedicated energy crop feedstocks are a mix of fast growing trees and grasses, as these crops are potentially more suitable to land of low productivity, have low lifecycle emissions and can be converted for use across the range of sectors'. But CCC see Carbon Capture and Storage as vital in many cases: 'If CCS is not available at the scale envisaged, the amount of bioenergy required to meet the 2050 target would have to be significantly higher than 10% of primary energy demand, and would imply land use change exceeding currently estimated sustainability limits.'

They also warn that 'given limits on domestic supply, much of the forest biomass for power and heat used in the UK will have to be imported'. Nevertheless they feel able to conclude that 'Scenarios for global land use which take account of required food production suggest that a reasonable UK share of potential sustainable bioenergy supply could extend to around 10% (200 TWh) of primary energy demand in 2050. However, it would be unsafe at present to assume any higher levels of bioenergy supply, and even the 10% level might require some trade-offs versus other desirable environmental and social objectives (e.g.through energy crops production encroaching on land of high biodiversity value).' But they want tighter limits: 'the threshold for use of biomass to meet the RO should be tightened to 200 gCO2/kWh. This would represent a significant enough saving relative to gas-fired generation, allowing a margin for emissions from possible indirect deforestation.'

Clearly they do not see biomass as likely to play a major role, although they suggest that there might be range of 'sensible smaller-scale local uses' - such as making use of old cooking oil to run buses, using food or farm waste in anaerobic digestion plants, or using woodchip from tree surgery waste in biomass boilers. Pretty marginal then, with CCC concluding 'The role for use of biomass in heating buildings is likely to be relatively limited in the longer term, given alternative low-carbon options such as air-source and ground-source heat pumps. Where these are not feasible, there may be opportunities for district heating using waste heat from large-scale low-carbon thermal power plants (potentially including biomass CCS) or CHP using local waste or biomass, and for biomass boilers using local biomass in rural homes.'

This may be too dismissive a view. Certainly, in practice, biomass/biogas energy options are still struggling to get going on a significant scale in the UK, with objections still emerging to some large-scale power projects, but some are still moving ahead.

E.ONs controversial 150MW biomass power station in the Royal Portbury Docks, near Bristol, has got the go ahead, despite concerns about its part reliance on imported virgin wood. It will also use dedicated energy crops, and locally sourced waste wood. E.ON has said it would set up a community investment fund, contributing £50,000 per year for charitable and educational community projects in the area, while a further £75,000 would also be set aside to trial green buses and improve cycle routes in the area.

However, E.ON told BusinessGreen that it was reviewing its plans for this and other renwable energy projects, in light of proposed changes to subsidies offered under the government's Renewable Obligation scheme. Drax also seem to be having second thoughts again about their biomass co-firing projects, complaining that there was not enough RO support

Meanwhile, Sheffield Council is looking at plans for a £20m waste wood CHP project in the Holbrook area , following on from the agreed E.ON's £120m 30MW waste wood biomass plant on the site of the old Blackburn Meadows power station next to the M1, now under construction. In addition, RES has plans for a 100MW biomass plant in Northumberland on Blyth River.

An energy from waste/biomass complex has also been proposed for the Ince Park development located at the Manchester Ship Canal, as a joint venture between Peel Environmental and Covanta Energy. Construction of the EfW facility is set to begin soon aiming for operation in 2015. Peel Energy has also got planning permission for a separate 20MW biomass energy facility on the site, with construction scheduled to start early next year. Plants like this, which involve combustion, are often opposed by environmentalists due to possible emissions (especially if wastes are used) and also the land-use/ biodivesity implications of large scale biomass growing/importation

In Wales, in a novel project which should avoid these issues, BiogenGreenfinch have been appointed by Gwynedd Council as the preferred bidder for the construction of a new green energy plant which will take council collected food waste and turn it into renewable energy via Anaerobic Digestion. The new AD plant, which should be running soon, will process around 11,000 tonnes of food waste each year; converting it into renewable electricity and biofertiliser for use on nearby farmland. The food waste will be collected from local homes and businesses via a collection scheme run by Gwynedd Council. The new plant will replace the existing landfill site currently situated in Llwyn Isaf and should play a major role in helping the Council meet their statutory recycling targets. It will be the second waste-fed anaerobic digestion plant built in Wales, following the construction of the Premier Foods plant last year near Newport.

In this case, the biogas is burnt to produce electricity, but AD biogas can also be added to the gas main, with, despite CCC's rather negative assessment, the prospects for 'green gas' from waste AD being increasingly seen as a new possible direction for green heat supply-in Germany especially. For more: www.biogas-info.co.uk.

While CCC may be a little sniffy about biogas, the new DECC/DEFRA/DfT Bioenergy Strategy is a lot more positive, as is the parallel DECC Heat Strategy. Although they do not see biogas playing a role in domestic heating directly, they do envisage biomass and biogas being used for community heating via CHP plants linked to district heating networks. I will be exploring this, and the green heating options. in my next few Blogs.

CCC report: www.theccc.org.uk/reports/bioenergy-review

Some consumers have been able to make use of the 'Clean Energy Cashback' Feed In Tariff scheme to get paid for generating their own renewable electricity , and exporting any excess to the grid. Around 1GW of solar PV has now been installed in the UK as result. But not everyone can afford the large capital outlay for PV solar or other domestic-scale renewables. For those still keen to use green energy, one option is to buy it in via a green retail scheme. There are a lot on offer, but it is sometimes hard to decide how reliable they are- how can consumers be sure they are really getting green power?

To try to help, an independent voluntary Green Energy Supply Certification Scheme was set up for domestic consumers and small businesses, and has been running since Feb. 2011, with 13 UK green electricity tariffs certified by August 2011. The Scheme is bound by Ofgem's Green Supply Guidelines. It is overseen by an independent panel of experts with the National Energy Foundation as Panel Secretariat.

The Scheme awards a 'green label' to electricity tariffs that deliver a real, measurable green gains. Not all tariffs marketed as green in the UK are certified by the voluntary Scheme but evidently all those who have applied has been given certification without the need for major adjustments. However, despite relatively high public awareness of environmental issues, green tariffs still account for only 1% of demand. In part that is because of some confusion- and cynicism- as to what green power really is.

The basic initial idea was that suppliers would contract with consumers to match the electricity they use with electricity from renewable sources, and set green tariff rates, which were likely to be higher than normal rates. So it was voluntary scheme for those who wanted to support renewables more, since they cost more at present.

However it was complicated by the advent of the Renewables Obligation (RO) which requires suppliers to source increasing proportions of the electricity they sell to all consumers from renewable source, with the extra cost passed on to all comsumers. It would be unfair for the same electricity also to be sold under the voluntary scheme- those consumers would then in effect be charged twice. So it was proposed that the electricity had to come from projects that were outside/additional to those operating under the RO scheme. The problem was that there weren't many of them and they tend to be the higher cost projects, so pushing the voluntary green tariff level even further up.

Some critics also argued that, as far a developing renewables rapidly on a large scale was concerned, it was far better to go for the RO, which passed the extra cost on to all electricity consumers, than the rely on voluntary support from a small minority, who would otherwise be in effect subsidising others not to bother. But then that's the nature of charity, and if some are willing to pay more, altruistically, then it all helps. A more fundamental issue was that, as a Datamonitor Survey reported, 27% of respondents did not trust their energy company, and did not believe that their energy would actually come from (or be matched by) a renewable source. The Green Energy Supply Certification Scheme aimed to try to resolve that credibility issue.

In terms of the green tariffs on offer now, what has emerged is something of a compromise. Some green suppliers do supply 100% green power at a premium price from fully additional sources, or like Good Energy, 'retire' the ROCs they get from RO credited projects. But some don't charge more and don't use additional sources- in which case additionality is achieved by offering other, indirect, green benefits- specially established funds fed from a percentage from the sales receipts, for the development of renewable energy projects (e.g. the Juice fund for marine renewables) energy efficiency projects or eco/offset projects e.g. reafforestation.

The Green Energy Supply Certification Scheme requires that these projects must result in the abatement of at least a minimum level of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) emissions- set at 50 kg p.a per tariff for funds/efficiency projects and 1 tonne for offsets. There has recently been a consultation on whether these levels should now be raised, and on other aspects of the scheme. The main concern however for it to be better known and used!

www.greenenergyscheme.org.

• Next year consumers should be able to get support for installing heat producing renewables, under the proposed Renewable Heat Incentive domestic tariff scheme, but there are already some voluntary green heat retail schemes on offer.

Germany now gets around 20% of it electricity from renewables with 28 GW of wind and 25 GW of photovoltaics, plus biomass and hydro. But it's aiming to expand that dramatically, in stages, to 35% by 2020 and 80% by 2050. Can it be done?

Germany can currently meet about 40% of its of its domestic power demand from PV solar on sunny summer days, while wind can supply a significant amount in winter when its strongest. In addition, within each season, both sources obviously vary from day to day and from hour to hour- and solar is always zero at night! These basic characteristics are the first key things you might need to know when considering if renewable can take over the bulk of power production. The second key thing is to do with location- most of the wind sites are in the north, the best solar in the south.

Given these two factors (timing and location) you can see why Germany is very focused now on energy storage and transmission issues. The basic energy resources are not the main problem - there seems to be enough to support a vast expansion: see www.uba.de/uba-info-medien-e/3997.html.

But the overall energy system will have to be radically revamped in order to use them effectively, with upgraded grid transmission and new storage capacity. However it goes beyond that. What is needed is a new engineering philosophy for the energy system design.

At present most power grid systems around the world are built on the basis of having a few large power plants feeding electricity down the grid to a large number remote consumers. Some of these plants, often nuclear plants, are kept running continuously to meet 'baseload' demand i.e. the minimum level of demand, while other plants are kept ready to ramp up to full power to meet the daily peaks in demand. For the moment renewables have simply been added on to this centralised system. But they don't fit very well. They are often variable, smaller scale and distributed around the country. They need a different, more decentralised and flexible system. And it has been argued that we need to decide which one we want to use in future.

Germany has already decided. The German-Federal Minister of the Environment Norbert Röttgen said in 2010: 'It is economically nonsensical to pursue two strategies at the same time, for both a centralized and a decentralized energy supply system, since both strategies would involve enormous investment requirements. I am convinced that the investment in renewable energies is the economically more promising project. But we will have to make up our minds. We can't go down both paths at the same time'.

On this view baseload isn't a help, in the new decentralised flexible energy supply and demand system, it's an inflexible hindrance. In the new system, rather than having 'always-on' baseload (e.g. nuclear) plants, and then following any extra load with peaking plants (usually gas), in the new system, variable loads and variable supply (from renewables) are balanced via a smart grid with demand-side measures, load peak shaving/delay, energy storage, and backup sources. That's just what Germany plans to move to.

The backup/balancing power will, for the moment, mostly be from natural gas plants, although later geothermal or biomass plants could take over. In addition use can be made of hydro reservoirs for storage/balancing- and that's going to be expanded in Germany. But the really interesting new idea is to use surplus renewable electricity to make green gasses, hydrogen and then also possibly methane, using some CO2, and store it for later use for generation to meet peaks. See www.fraunhofer.de/en/press/research-news/2010/04/green-electricity-storage-gas.html

All this means that there's no need for nuclear baseload and that the use of natural gas can gradually decline. The Fraunhofer Institute modeled the renewables projected for 2020 and found that the need for baseload power will fall by half by then. Depending on how fast biogas substitution for natural gas can expand, that could mostly be coal fired by then. Ideally, given their carbon emissions, Germany should of course phase out coal plants before nuclear plants, or fossil gas use, but coal and fossil gas will be needed for a while for balancing.

There are of course other ideas. Nuclear supporters may say that, rather than going to all the bother of having wind plants backed up, why not stick to the old system and keep nuclear for baseload, and dump coal, while using renewables when they are available, storing any excess renewables as gas to meet peaks. In addition some new nuclear plants can load follow, to a some degree. They also point to the alleged wonders of Liquid Flouride Thorium Reactors, claimed as a safer nuclear option. But these are long shot ideas, decades away at best, and few in Germany will now look at nuclear. It is out, full stop. Instead it's pushing hard for a decentral system based on renewables and energy efficiency.

That has social and political attractions, as well as reducing carbon emissions and the threat of nuclear accidents. As Craig Morris has commented in an interesting review of the German programme, 'Germany is replacing central-station plants that can only be run by large corporations with truly distributed renewable power. While Germany's Big Four utilities make up around three quarters of total power generation, they only own seven percent of green power. Roughly three quarters of renewable power investments have been made by individuals, communities, farmers, and small and midsize enterprises'.

He notes that a 'a small-town energy revolution is going on in Germany, with more than 100 rural communities becoming 100% renewable.', and concludes 'so one reason why Germans might not mind paying a little more for green power is that they largely pay that money back to their communities and themselves, not to corporations'.

Will it work?

Phasing out nuclear by 2022 is a bold move. The opponents have painted grim pictures of prices hikes, blackouts, increased use of coal, with more emissions, and massive imports of nuclear electricity from France and gas from Russia. But in March 2011 the Federal Environment Agency, said that in principle 'all of Germany's nuclear power stations could be taken offline permanently by 2017,' without resulting in 'supply bottlenecks or in appreciably higher electricity prices.' Furthermore, it claimed 'Germany's climate protection targets would not be compromised and Imports of nuclear power from abroad are not necessary'. Given the 2022 closure date in the event chosen, although it will clearly involve major challenges, there should be fewer problems.

And certainly, in reality, the lights have stayed on, emissions have fallen (by 2.2% in 2011) and the small prices rises don't seem to have led to much opposition given the wide scale opposition to nuclear. In addition, Germany is still exporting power (net) to France, and as Craig Morris notes, if excess renewable power is converted into green gas and stored, then it won't have to worry too much about imports, or interruption due to the weather. He says that German researchers have estimated that getting 100% renewables would only 'require up to two weeks at a time to be bridged during the winter,' far less than the 4 months gas storage already available.

It looks like they can do it.

Craig Morrison's article: www.renewablesinternational.net/the-german-switch-from-nuclear-to-renewables-myths-and-facts/150/537/33308/ See also David Roberts helpful review: http://grist.org/renewable-energy/why-germany-is-phasing-out-nuclear-power

German Renewable Energies Agency report: www.unendlich-viel-energie.de/en/details/article/523/renewable-energies-and-base-load-power-plants-are-they-compatible.html The Federal Environment Agency's 2011 report 'Restructuring electricity supply in Germany,' is available from: www.umweltbundesamt.de

The UK's current energy plan envisages electricity being the main focus, with excess power from offshore wind and nuclear being used to run heat pumps and to charge batteries in electric vehicles. Natural Gas takes a back seat as a heat source, but is used in CCGT plants to supply some electricity, and these gas turbines also act as back-up plants to balance the variable renewables, although gradually some may become biomass fired. All of this will require new grid links, possibly also to the rest of the EU. So that's the 'wire' view.

It's the dominant one at present. The new DECC Heat Strategy review says 'electricity is universally available' and, in well-insulated houses, it says heat pumps can make using it for heating relatively economic.

The rival 'pipe' view is that electricity is a poor energy vector, since its transmission is lossy and it can't easily be stored, except via pumped hydro. Also domestic scale heat pumps are not that reliable, especially in cold weather.

By contrast, gas can be easily stored and transmitted: we actually already have an extensive low loss, high transmission efficiency gas grid, which handles around four times more energy than the electricity grid. Moreover, the gas grid acts as an energy store helping us to cope with variable demand. And we can produce biogas from municipal and farm wastes to provide a carbon neutral replacement for natural gas. In addition to its use for heating, some of this green gas could be used for local electricity generation, where needed, in CCGT or fuel cells. Some could even be used for vehicles, as a better option than mostly imported biofuels.

The weak point in this argument is that there probably won't be enough biogas to replace all the gas used for heating (National Grid says about 50%, optimistically), much less transport and electricity generation. There are land-use constraints to biomass production and limits to how much waste is available. Moreover, biomass and wastes are, in any case, more suited to local use e.g. in local Combined Heat and Power (CHP) plants, or heat only plants. That would avoid having to shift biomass/wastes in bulk around the country. It's not quite the same for biogas: although that's best generated locally from farms and municipal waste, and some could be used locally, some could also be distributed via the gas main, to power electricity generation plants where needed, as well as being use directly for heating in homes, as at present.

However the use of gas by consumers directly for heating may not be the best bet. Natural gas fired plants, and increasingly biomass fired plants, linked to district heating (DH) networks, could be more efficient option and play a major role, as elsewhere in the EU. Indeed solar-fired DH is now moving ahead across the EU, usually linked to heat stores, and in some cases inter-seasonal heat stores. So that's an extension of the 'pipe' view- we can distribute heat as well as gas. Clearly DH only makes sense in urban and perhaps suburban areas, and it also make sense, if we are burning gas, whether natural or bio, to use medium or even large scale high-efficiency combined heat and power plants. Then we also get some electricity, with the ratio of heat to power being adjustable.

The 'pipe' view is that this make much more sense, in efficiency terms, than installing micro CHP units in individual homes- with large CHP, the heat and power produced can be better balanced against the varying demands of large numbers of consumers. And big CHP/DH systems with heat stores can also help balance varying power grid inputs from renewables

Even so we may not have enough biomass or biogas to run this system- and any solar input will inevitably need backup. That's where the next element in the 'pipe' argument comes in. We can produce hydrogen gas, using electricity from excess off-peak wind and other variable renewables via electrolysis, store it and then add it to the gas main for distribution, or use it for electricity production when needed. Some also look to syngas production from renewable electricity for vehicle fuel.

There are some quite severe efficiency loss penalties with some of the energy conversion processes required for making, storing and using 'green hydrogen', but the technology is improving, with Germany taking a lead: see my next Blog.

So why not consider the pipe option? Certainly the 'wire' option looks tricky. It is likely to be hard to get enough electricity generation from renewables, like offshore wind, to meet all (or most) of the UK's power heat and transport needs. We are talking of perhaps, by 2050, 180-200GW of offshore wind, including floating wind farms further out to sea. Plus maybe some wave and tidal stream. If nothing else, the grid connection costs and problems for renewables on this scale look very serious. But the 'pipe' approach also has its limits. If we really are to avoid the biogas limits by producing hydrogen from
offshore wind (etc) for the gas grid, then we would come up against the same problem with getting enough offshore capacity. In both cases, with high costs - and a need for gas plant backup.

In a way then the two approaches are not that different, at least if we are talking, in the pipe version, about large scale generation of green hydrogen: they both rely on having lots of renewable electricity. But they do differ in the main transmission vectors - electricity or gas pipes or wires.

In theory we could have a mix of both: there could be some useful complementarity between the wire and pipe approaches, reducing some of the constraints. But in practice, under present competitive market approaches, there can be conflicts. For example, it's been said that in Denmark there is a danger that wind energy will drive CHP systems out of business: electricity production from local CHP systems in Denmark went down by 24% from 2000 to 2009. And in the UK, large scale CHP has hardly even started- we have had so much cheap gas. That may not change, if shale gas turns out to be plentiful and cheap, despite its alleged environmental risks. But in that situation, emissions aside, providing backup for wind would be easier, although the pipe lobby might still argue that gas should be used for heating rather than electricity generation.

Technological advances may help change the picture-if we adopt sensible approaches to infrastructure, so that new supply systems can be plugged on to the heat and power grids. Large scale heat pumps linked to DH systems, or large hydrogen or biogas fired fuel cells for urban CHP, are amongst the options. But cheaper offshore wind would be the key breakthrough. Or for that matter, cheaper wave or tidal power. Some also see PV solar as emerging to cut across much of this debate. Then again there's Carbon Capture and Storage. If that proves to be viable (and acceptable) on a large scale, then both the Wire and Pipe lobbies benefit, although the gas/pipe lobby might have an edge, since then the combustion of green gas/biomass would be carbon negative.

The DECC Heat Strategy Review looks at some of these options, but basically still comes down in favour of electrification of heat supply, with the role of gas diminishing, although it does also back district heating networks in urban areas. The debate continues!

www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/meeting-energy-demand/heat/4805-future-heating-strategic-framework.pdf

Bent Sorensen, a leading Danish alternative energy pioneer, who wrote a seminal and massive text book on 'Renewable Energy' and many other important research papers (see http://energy.ruc.dk), has turned his hand to a slightly different project and produced a 'History of Energy' (Earthscan). It looks in fascinating detail at the history of energy production and use, mainly in Denmark, from the stone age to the present day, linking that to social, economic and political developments and influences. So we move through early pre- history, the middle ages , the industrial revolution, the second world war and then on to the more recent battle against nuclear and the dramatic growth in the use of renewables.

In each era there is a detailed analysis of Danish energy generation and use, with, through most of history, ambient energy sources, food and muscle power inevitably playing the dominant role, but fossil fuels then rapidly taking over, leading to massive increases in energy use in recent decades- much of it based on imported fuel.

The historical details and interactions are well developed and it's inherently fascinating to view history from a national perspective other than one's own. Although academic historians might not be happy with the story telling and commentary, especially as the author was directly involved with some of the more recent events, that actually makes it very interesting. Indeed it might have been good to have more reminiscences, but then perhaps it would be too autobiographical. As it is, the marriage of energy and history, although strained in places, works well, leading to some interesting insights e.g. into why Denmark has been so progressive in relation to renewables and so hostile to nuclear- as symbolised by the ubiquitous 'Nuclear Power, No Thanks' smiling sun logo.

The 'bottom up' grass roots resistance to nuclear led to a decision to abandon plans for nuclear power and spilled over into practical 'bottom-up' support for the development of renewables. One factor in this seems to have been the existence of a national network of libertarian Folk High Schools. Starting in 1975, one radical school, Tvind, even built giant 2MW wind turbine themselves, completed in 1978- an amazing feat; well ahead of its time. It's still running: www.tvind.dk/TextPage.asp?MenuItemID=55&SubMenuItemID=160

It helped stimulate the boom in grass roots developed and co-operatively run wind projects in Denmark- with around 80% of Denmark's wind projects being locally owned. And the Danes continue to be innovative, with a plan from the new Centre-left government to get 50% of Denmarks power from renewables by 2020, with coal then being phased out from electricity generation by 2030, and all power and heat coming from renewables by 2035. All of course with no nuclear. www.europeanenergyreview.eu/site/pagina.php?id=3417.

That's not to say there are not problems. Sorensen ends the book with a look at globalisation and consumerism, highlighting the 'enough is enough' view, but in true Danish style, in a non-dogmatic way.

With many other countries around the world now also looking to a non-nuclear future, Denmark is inevitably seen as something of a template, so this book could become very valuable, even if it doesn't provide much detail on the contemporary battles. For example, wind already generates about 25% of its average annual electricity output. But not all of it can be used in Denmark- at times there is too much and excess electricity is exported e.g. to Norway. At other times, when there's not enough wind, Denmark imports power back from them- e.g. from their large hydro plants, some of which can be used for pumped storage - in effect an interim store for Danish wind power. Overall it's roughly balanced, though Denmark gets charged more for the imports than it gets for its exports- so making its wind energy more expensive. But all this energy is non-fossil, so, wherever it's used, there's no carbon emission.

However energy demand in Denmark is still rising and national fossil fuel use hasn't reduced significantly yet, with as elsewhere, transport being a key issue. But they're clearly trying to tackle that and to get to zero net carbon, with increased commitment to energy efficiency and more use of renewables, including heat supplying renewables. Around 60% of Denmarks heat is supplied via district heating networks, some of it from biomass, and the aim is for around 40% of the district heating to be supplied from solar inputs, backed up by heat stores, by 2050.

Germany of course has a somewhat similar plan, following the decision to phase out nuclear entirely by 2022. It aims to get 35% its electricity from renewables by 2020, 50% by 2030 and then 80% by 2050, with parallel development of heat supplying renewables. Following the referendum last year, in which 94% opposed nuclear, Italy's new government is pressingly ahead with renewables strongly, PV especially. And with the Presidential elections soon in France, nuclear is a key issue: opposition has reached 70% in some polls, and the socialists have called for a phase out, with 24 nuclear reactors (nearly half the current fleet) being closed by 2025, and a commensurate expansion of the renewables programme. A similar phase out programme has emerged in Belgium, while Switzerland is not going to replace it nuclear plants- so in effect opting for a phase out.

With much of the rest of western Europe having long standing non-nuclear policies, and the UK nuclear expansion programme looking decidely shaky after the withdrawl of E.ON and RWE, it could be that, when and if a new 'History of Energy' is written, Denmark's pioneering stance may turn out to be the one that dominantes.

Of course the situation elsewhere is different. For example, in Asia. Although Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines have all moved away from nuclear, India remains committed to nuclear expansion, as is China, and we still await Japans new plan. However, at present only one reactor is operating in Japan and it is far from clear if any of the closed plants will be allowed to reopen, given the widespread and expanding opposition to nuclear power following the Fukushima disaster.

Maybe times are changing. They do seem to be in Europe. For example, when E.ON pulled out of the UK nuclear programme, its CEO explained that "We have come to the conclusion that investments in renewable energies, decentralised generation and energy efficiency are more attractive - both for us and for our British customers".

Some say that technology itself in neutral- it's just lumps of metal or whatever that can be used for good or for evil. In itself it has no 'values', positive or negative. What matters is how it is used. You hear this 'use/abuse' model from various sources- including the US gun lobby! But it also re-emerged at the 'AT@40' conference in March in London, called to mark 40 years since the first big Alternative Technology conference held at UCL in 1972. See my earlier Blog: http://www.environmentalresearchweb.org/blog/2012/03/back-to-basics.html

The 1972 AT gathering had looked at the range of new smaller-scale decentralised and ecologically sound technologies that was emerging then. They were sometimes presented as being inherently 'better', socially, environmentally and politically than that what existed- with nuclear power being a commonly cited example of a 'bad' technology.

That was certainly one of the key ideas behind the 'AT' Alternative Technology movement in its early years, as Peter Harper explained eloquently at AT@40. In the 1970s it was for some of us becoming increasingly clear that things were going wrong - the promises offered by science and technology were now looking more like threats - to the ecosystem and to human survival. We didn't want to abandon science or technology, but we needed something better, something that re-established or rebalanced the links between human aspirations, the cultures and wisdom our societies had created, and the planet - the ecosystem of which we were a part. The fear of eco-doom and nuclear annihilation provided the impetus for a range of counter movements and 'AT' was one, offering a set of basic principles- summarised well in the 1970s book Radical Technology.

However, looking back, as at AT@40, it is not automatically clear if you can codify social and environmental 'appropriateness' in technical principles for all time. The context changes. And as the social constructivist viewpoint says, it is in any case a process- the specific technologies that emerge simply reflect the values of those in power. So small-scale diy renewables may be challenging to the status quo in one context, but not in others. Conversely, larger scale technologies may be an imposition in some situations in others they may be liberatory. A bit of a slippery argument that, though. What is left is a set of values and basic principle e.g. as Godfrey Boyle argued at AT@40, you should apply the subsiduarity principle: technologies should be chosen and scaled at the lowest possible level /size and be as amenable to widescale democratic control as possible, with minimum eco and social impacts. But you can't fix or lock the values in the technology itself permanently: instead it's a continual social and political process.

That's certainly the 'social construction of technology' view- technology isn't just inanimate hardware, it also dependent for its creation and operation on social processes and perceptions and these are perhaps more important than the actual thing itself. For example, from a 'labour process' point of view, the Luddites opposed the new spinning technology because it took away their control over the livelihoods. They weren't opposed to the technology itself, just the way it was being used- to deskill and impoverish them. Only if the technology won't, by its nature, allow workers and society an opportunity to control it effectively should it be opposed.

Some say that nuclear power is an example of that, in that is requires tight security, hierarchical control and central elites to run and fund it. But others have argued that, whereas under capitalism, nuclear is dangerous, under socialism (or whatever variety of self-managed society you'd prefer), it could be controlled!

Against that is the belief that some technologies like nuclear power are so fundamentally flawed (e.g. by creating long lived radioactive material) they could never be redeemed- there will always be a problem, regardless of the society and its controls. A fundmanentalist green approach.

It's interesting that Greenpeace, in its response to Fukushima, didn't adopt this 'absolutists' line. It said 'it was not a natural disaster which led to the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi plant, but the failures of the Japanese Government, regulators and the nuclear industry' It added 'The Fukushima nuclear accident exposes the deep and systemic failure of the very institutions that are supposed to control nuclear power and protect people from its accidents', which, by implication, could be taken to mean that these problems were, in theory, resolvable. Are they preparing the way for acceptance of 'better' nuclear, under 'better' control? More likely they were simply talking up the compensation bid on behalf of those affected and seeking to toughen up the controls and costs, so that nuclear became even less viable in future!

Despite some relativistic 'sliding scale' grey areas, the 'social construction' approach does move us beyond just totting up economic and social costs and benefits in a passive technocratic way, treating technology as a fixed thing that simply 'impacts' on society: it's choice design, development and use are all social and political processes. Even so, maybe some options ought to be ruled out automatically, as always likely to be beyond the pale. Napalm for example. Or cluster bombs. But then we are adopting an absolutist, essentially 'moral', and therefore arguably arbitrary, position. If 'the enemy' (however defined- it might be hostile Martians) is at the gate, should we use napalm, or nukes, if that's all there is available that works? Maybe, but surely not if the 'enemy' is just nature, constraining our desire to continue living in the way we do! We are part of it, and we need to coexist, choosing and using technologies that do not abuse the environment or people.

Brazil, Russia, India and China, the so-called BRIC countries, are all rapidly industrialising, or in the case of Russia, re-industrialising, and at the same time facing major climate policy issues. Basically how can they have economic growth without compromising their own, and global, climate security? A new book, 'Feeling the Heat', in the Palgrave 'Energy, Climate and Environment' series, seeks to explore how they are trying to develop energy and climate policies, focusing on internal political processes and constraints. A multi-authored text, edited by Ian Bailey and Hugh Compston from, respectively, Plymouth and Cardiff University, it's something of a companion to their earlier 'Turning Down the Heat', which looked at the politics of climate change in the affluent democracies.

While we may be familiar with the national political battles over climate policies in the UK, EU, USA and more recently Australia, the political situation in the BRIC countries, for example in terms of public reactions to what are often seen as draconian proposal for change, is sometimes not that much different- and the suggested remedies are similar. They include better communication to convince people of the need for radical change, coupled with an emphasis on the positive benefits that could accrue in terms of jobs, economic security and of course health and safety. Given that what happens in the rapidly expanding BRIC countries may shape the global future, it's well worth looking at.

What are the technical renewable energy supply options for the BRICs? Globally renewable energy supplied an estimated 16% of global final energy consumption and delivered close to 20% of global electricity production. The BRIC countries are making their mark: for example renewables accounted for about 26% of China's total installed electric capacity in 2010, 18% of electricity generation, and more than 9% of final energy supply. This along with India's smaller input, helped make Asia a dominant supplier of renewable energy, while Latin America has increased its supply of renewable energy by over 50%, with Brazil making major contributions . See REN21 2011 review: www.ren21.net

Much of this growth is based on biomass and that could expand further. The World Bioenergy Association says that biomass currently supplies around 10% of global energy, which it notes means that it is already around double the size of nuclear energy globally. But it forecasts the potential for global bioenergy utilisation in 2050 to be 20-30 times the present use. Clearly there are land-use and biodiversity issues to face, something Brazil has be battling with for some time in terms of deforestation, but also in relation to its biofuels (ethanol) programme. Large hydro is also problematic- that is the mainstay of China's programme, the only large renewable so far in Russia (supplying 21% of electricity) and also the major contributor in Brazil, accounting for 69% of the total installed capacity in 2010.

Less problematically, wind power is also expanding: China has over 45GW in place and plans to have 100GW by 2015. It is moving offshore- it plans to have 30GW offshore by 2020. The technically exploitable onshore wind resources is put at 300 GW, and offshore resources are up to 700 GW

India has 13GW of wind capacity in place on land and plans to expand that, but is also pushing ahead with solar- it is aiming for 20GW to be deployed by 2022. Brazil is also pushing ahead with both wind and solar. Solar heating is in widespread use and its wind target is 1,423MW under the PROINFA programme. The theoretical potential for wind is put at 140 GW.

As in China and Brazil, Russia's renewables programme is dominated by hydro, but in terms of new renewables, it is moving quite slowly: it currently only gets 0.5% of it power from renewables, but aims to increase that to 4.5% from 25 GW installed by 2020. However, the potential wind resource is very large. One study put the Northern Russia/NW Siberian resource at 350GW.

Of all the BRICs, China is pushing renewables the hardest- with a target of getting 16% of its total energy for renewables and low carbon sources by 2020, although Brazil has a head start in that it already gets around 50% of its electricity from hydro and has a significant biofuels programme. To move things on, some help for the BRICs and other developing countries is coming from the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP), which has recently announced the first 21 projects to be funded in its €3m 8th Programme. Five projects target China, including a study on a national-level carbon trading framework with the Energy Research Institute of the NDRC, and support for a study on smartgrid technology for integrating renewables into China's grid. REEEPs funding is made possible by donations from the governments of the UK and Norway. REEEP previously disbursed €4.7m in 2009, €3.2 m in 2007, €2.2 m in 2006 and €1.1 m in 2005.
www.reeep.org/58.20416/reeep-allocates-y3-million-to-21-low-carbon-energy-projects.htm

In their book, Bailey and Compston conclude 'China's investments in renewable energy, Brazil's deforestation and biofuels policies and India's efforts to combat black carbon offer glimpses of the opportunities, but many more co-benefit and development enhancing policies will be needed'.

In terms of funding, REEEPs input is relatively small and the Kyoto Clean Development Mechanism has its limits. Perhaps more important are the internal and external political processes that define the overall strategies adopted by the BRICs. As Bailey and Compston put it, the BRICs also have other perhaps more urgent priorities, and will make comparisons with the what the already developed world is doing: 'Progress by industrializing countries in curbing their emissions will inevitably return attention to the deficiencies of climate policy in the developed countries and the need for their governments find ways to resolve political obstacles to the further development of climate policy in their countries,' with the focal strategy often inevitably being 'to prioritize policies that offer significant co-benefits alongside reducing emissions'.

• All of the BRICs have nuclear programmes of various scales (Russia gets17% of its electricity from nuclear, Brazil 3.1%, India 2.9%, China 1.8%), with expansion planned. See my earlier Blog on nuclear and the developing world: http://environmentalresearchweb.org/blog/renew-your-energy/2012/02/

The potential for renewables within the EU, new and old, is very large with several scenarios now suggesting that up to 100% of EU electricity could be generated by 2050 from these sources. Certainly it seems likely that the uses of wind power in particular will continue to expand. At the start of 2012, wind generation capacity was at around 94GW in the EU, led by Germany at about 29GW and Spain at 22GW. France was at about 6.8GW, Italy 6.7, the UK 6.5GW- it has risen since to 6.6GW with new offshore wind projects. But although so far all much lower, the new EU countries of central and eastern europe are also making their mark, for example in wind power, led by Poland at 1,616 MW, with Romania having 982MW, Bulgaria 612MW, Hungary 329MW, and the Czech Republic 217MW. And the prospects for expansion in the new EU are large. For example, the new EU renewable energy targets for 2020 are quite challenging, with many of the new EU countries expected to achieve significant increases.

However, there are also many countries on the boarders of the EU, some of them candidates for entry who might also contribute. For example, Turkey had 1.8GW of wind capacity by the end of 2011. Some others may be eligible at some point (for example perhaps Georgia, Albania and the Ukraine and even Armenia and Azerbaijan) but not most of the other ex-Soviet states in the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent Stares) further east- for example Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. They have extensive untapped renewable energy resources.

These countries could well become net exporters of renewable power to the EU- since they have large resources and low populations. Their renewable generation potential, if Ukraine is included, comes to a total of about 32GW for wind and 46GW for hydro, with perhaps 50 TWh p.a. from wind and 300TWh from hydro, all by around 2020. That's similar to the total electricity consumption in the UK- and that's leaving out biomass and geothermal, which some of these countries have in plenty, which could supply electricity as well as heat. Longer term the potential is much larger. For example the total wind resource in Kazakhstan has been put at 210 GW.

It could be that as an EU wide supergrid emerges, extension into areas like this will become an important element, the wider geographical footprint ensuring better cross system balancing of locally variable renewables source like wind.

Prognosis

Although some good progress has been made, with the EU as a whole taking renewables increasingly seriously, the prognosis for the short to medium term in the eastern EU and also for those beyond, is mixed.

It is possible that many of the new EU countries will focus for now mostly on their often ample coal supplies and also back nuclear, while those further east may just focus on their gas and oil resources. Certainly, a major pre-occupation at present is getting any sort of energy they can, while trying to unlock themselves from reliance on Russia- and while also being able to sell oil and gas from the east to the EU: the current hot issue is the development of new power transmission and gas/oil pipeline links.

But it could be that as they come to realise the huge potential demand for green power in the EU, as well as the scale of their own large renewable resources, the eastern countries outside the EU, may look to exports and CDM and JI schemes, as well as to the GO Credit scheme, as a source of income.

Of course it might be argued that really they should simply use this energy themselves, so as to stop using coal, oil and gas, but there will obviously be a strong temptation to sell it to the EU- to earn desperately needed money to revitalise their economies.

The big unknown is Russia. It has a very large renewable potential (e.g. perhaps 60GW of wind by 2020 and perhaps 350GW long term), so far almost completely untapped, apart from hydro, with new renewables accounting for just 0.5% of the total power consumption. For example it only has 9MW of wind capacity in place at present, and a target of obtaining about 4.5% of its electricity from renewables by 2020, with just 25GW installed. This perhaps reflects Putin's view that 'You couldn't transfer large electric power stations to wind energy, however much you wanted to. In the next few decades, it will be impossible' and that nuclear energy was the only 'real and powerful alternative' to oil and gas, with other approaches to meeting future energy demand being seen as 'claptrap.'

There is no shortage of views in, around and outside the EU hostile to the development of renewables, but with wind, solar, geothermal, biomass and, in some locations, the new marine renewables, all expanding rapidly, it would be foolish to try to ignore what many see as the main way ahead to a sustainable energy future, and also as a major economic and employment growth area.

The above is abstracted (and updated) from a paper reviewing the Open University 'New Europe-New Energy' project in a new Palgrave book, edited by Shmelev et al, on globalization and the environment entitled 'Sustainability Analysis: An Interdisciplinary Approach'. The OU Energy and Environment Research Unit's Central and Eastern Europe renewable/sustainable energy project started out looking at options and projects in the Baltic states and then moved on, via Romania and Bulgaria, to the Balkans, including projects in Croatia and then Albania. More recently, the OU team has been involved with a major EU-backed green energy project in Kosovo.